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ABSTRACT 
 
This article will address the Muslim politics in Malaysia in the light of the broader 
shifts towards democratization and Islamization by focusing on politics among the 
majority ethnic Malay community, followed an overview of the ideological rivalry 
between UMNO and PAS, with special reference to the electoral performances of 
these parties in the past three general elections (November 1999, March 2004 and 
March 2008) . It then explores the underlying reason for the perceived importance 
of Islam in understanding the voting trend among the Malay-Muslim electorate 
which raised the question to what extent was the discourse on Islam instrumental 
in persuading the Malays to switch their support from PAS to the UMNO during the 
2004 elections, and in the process of continued participation as an ‘Islamic Party’ in 
Malaysian mainstream politics what factors were that encouraged the PAS leaders 
to compromises and to play by the ‘rule of democracy’. In the concluding part of the 
article the writer also provide with an overview on reform agenda of Civilizational 
Islam (Islam Hadhari) under premiership of Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and the 
current  Malaysia’s  Transformation  Programme  (GTP)  under  the  leadership  of 
Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Tun Abdul Razak.  
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With  the  declining  influence  of  leftist  ideas  and  the  so-called  ‘crisis  of  authoritarianism’  in 
Muslim Middle East, North Africa and Southeast Asia, democracy seems poised to offer itself as a 
viable alternative. By the early 1990s, terms such as pluralism (al-ta’addudiyah), civil society 
(mujtama’  madani),  human  rights  (huquq  al-Insan),  freedom  (hurriyah)  and  transparency 
(shafafiyyah)  have  become  buzzwords  in  the  discourse  among  scholars  and  activists  alike 
(Haddad 1995: 76). Islamic activism too had shown signs of moving away from the radical 
‘fundamentalist’  phase  of  1970s  and  1980s  to  a  ‘participatory  phase’  characterized  by  a 
preference to work within the system and by a neo-reformism that questioned the traditional 
role of faith, its leadership, organization, priorities and interpretation (Wright 1992: 33). 
A parallel development was seen in the experiments with political liberalization made 
by the ruling elites, which led to the emergence of ‘Salvation Party’ in Algeria,  al-Nahdhah party 
in Tunisia and the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and Salafiyyah al-Nour party in Egypt and 
the AKP party in Turkey. These democratic experiments can be regarded as the shift in the 
orientation of Islamic activism. The general scenario then has been a series of shifts by both the 
dissident  Islamists  and  the  regimes  they  were  challenging:  the  former  in  direction  of 
championing  democracy  and  participation,  the  latter  in  the  direction  of  Islamization.  This 
section of this article explores contemporary Muslim politics in Malaysia in the light of these 
developments.  It  focuses  on the  relationship  between  the  two  major  competitors  in Malay-
Muslim  politics,  the  United  Malays  National  Organization  (UMNO),  and  the  dominant 
component in the National Front (NF) coalition government, and the opposition Islamic Party 
(PAS), both operating in the socio-political reality of multi-ethnic Malaysia as well as in the 
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‘unique Islamic experience, of its history (Esposito 1996: 124-149). It analyses these shifting 
trends and their implications for the future of Muslim politics and democracy in Malaysia. 
 
Malay-Muslim Politics: PAS from Radical Islam to Islamic Democracy 
 
The Pan- Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), a breakaway UMNO faction, was formed in 1951 and is 
the main opposition party with the capacity to undermine the National Front’s (NF) influence 
among  rural  Malays  (Farish  2004:  17-45).  Although  PAS  emphasized  on  Islamic  roots  and 
Islamic terminologies, but Islam as a system of governance was not placed at the forefront of the 
party’s agenda in the first three decades of its existence (Ahmad Hussein 2002: 75-107). In fact, 
the party congress in 1954 rejected a motion seeking the immediate establishment of an Islamic 
state. The party’s objective of Islamic governance was to be achieved incrementally through 
educating the public and nurturing an Islamic society, and through democratic means. However, 
PAS still neither portrayed UMNO and the government as Islamic and democratic, nor did it 
represent the interest of the Malay masses. It accused UMNO leaders and these non-Muslim 
coalition partners of promoting un-Islamic policies and encouraging decadent Western cultural 
influences.  
Among the opposition parties, PAS today has the most strongly defined objective. As a 
party motivated by Islam, PAS is principally devoted to the formation of an Islamic state in 
Malaysia. Accordingly, it espouses policies and ideas that are rooted in Islam. Adopting this 
preponderant  Islamic  posture,  PAS  has  been  offering  Malaysians,  Muslim  Bumiputeras  in 
particular, a vision of a society reformed through legislation based on religious tenets (Edmund 
2007: 1-23). The  establishment of an Islamic state, according to the party, will bring about 
spiritual regeneration and lead to the development of a more just, democratic, moral, principled 
and  socially  conscious  society,  devoid  of  repressive  legislation  and  unhealthy  economic 
activities such as gambling. 
Although  in  the  Malay  heartland,  especially  in  Kelantan  and  Terengganu,  PAS  has 
consistently enjoyed staunch support, estimated at 35-40 per cent of the electorate (Edmund 
2007:  8),  and  enabled  it  to  mobilize  sufficient  support  to  secure  control  of  Kelantan  state 
legislature in 1990 and retain control of it in the general election in 1995, 1999 and 2004. 
However, PAS leaders aware that their party could not win the national power by its own. The 
party’s electoral performances have been exceptional only when it has cooperated with other 
parties, as evident during the general elections of 1974, 1990 and 1999 (Edmund 2007: 8).  
When PAS was a member of the UMNO-led ruling National Front (NF) coalition from 
December 1972 until November 1977, the Islamic party secured 14 parliamentary seats and 46 
state  seats  during  the  1974  election.  In  1990,  when  PAS  was  a  member  of  the  opposition 
coalition, the APU (Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah or Muslim Unity Movement), comprising an 
UMNO breakaway faction, the party regained control of Kelantan after a 13-year hiatus, won 
seven parliamentary seats and 33 state seats. PAS remained a member of APU from April 1989 
until 1996, when this coalition dissolved (Edmund 2007: 9). 
In 1999, PAS became a member of another opposition coalition, the Alternative Front 
(Barisan Alternatif), comprising prominent opposition parties such as the Democratic Action 
Party  (DAP)  and  Parti  Keadilan  Rakyat  (Peoples  Justice  Party=PKR)  (Hong  1997,10),  an 
organization  linked  to  former  UMNO  deputy  president,  Anwar  Ibrahim.  During  the  general 
elections held that year, PAS registered a remarkable electoral performance, securing control of 
another state government, in Terengganu, and winning an unprecedented 27 parliamentary 
seats and 98 state seats, doubling its previous best performance in 1974 of 14 parliamentary 
and 46 state seats when it was a member of National Front (NF). 
Whatever  the  situation  was,  it  is  necessary  to  remember  here  that  although  in  the 
formative years between 1951 and 1956, PAS was ‘a political party in name only, but until today 
PAS remains the main opposition to the UMNO, the electoral trends over the past 15 years 
suggest that the Islamic party did not gain ground over the National Front (NF) because of its 
Islamic stance. PAS’s national influence is limited, and it is unable to record electoral gains International Journal of Islamic Thought 
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outside of the Malay world-the party secured a state seat in the state of Johor for the first time in 
its history by default. 
 
The Islamization of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) 
 
British indirect rule in the Malay Peninsula kept intact the privileges of the nine traditional 
sultans  and  the  aristocratic  classes  but  stripped them  of  real  power.  As  compensation,  the 
sultans were given control over ‘Malay culture and religion’. Official Islam under the patronage 
of  the  royal  houses,  with  some  powers  over  religious  education,  devotional  matters  and  a 
limited corpus of personal and family laws affecting Muslims, was thus institutionalized (Gullick 
1987: 37).  
An early Malay response to colonial ruled took the form of the modernist-reformist 
movement that emerged in the 1920s and 1930s.It was led by Muslim scholar-journalists who 
advocated  ideas  reason  and  modernity  against  the  conservatism  and  the  docility  of  the 
traditionalists who dominated the official Islam of the colonial state (Roff 1967: 37). This young 
faction  (Kaum Muda)  movement  failed  to  dislodge  the  old  faction  (Kaum Tua)  in  the  state 
Islamic bureaucracy. The movement was rendered ineffective by the actions of the authorities 
that ranged from physical force to official fatwas that prescribed the Kaum Muda’s ideas as 
‘deviationist’. The Kaum Muda’s pan –Islamism failed to attract mass Malay support and its 
rejection of the Malay royalty, which symbolized Malay political claim on the now multi-ethnic 
country, exacerbated the feeling of insecurity among the Malays. 
For all its failings, the modernist movement marked the beginning of organized Muslim 
politics among the Malays. It helped place Islam at the centre-stage of Malay politics. It brought 
substantive socio-political themes into public Islamic discourse beyond the traditional concern 
with personal piety. Its rise and decline also saw the emergence of elements of synthesis and 
symbiosis in Malay-Muslim politics. By the 1950s, the traditional place of Islam had become 
distinctly ‘modernist ’. Some of the key terms of Islamic modernism-reason, modern education, 
economic  development,  constitutional  government  and  Muslim  unity-had  become  part  and 
parcel of the official Islamic lexicon. The mass movement transformed itself in 1946 into the 
United Malays National Organization (UMNO) with Dato’ Jaafar, a member of the Johor Royal 
Family and a district officer in the colonial administrative service, as its president. Disagreement 
over non-Malay participation in national politics led to Dato’ Onn’s resignation in 1951. He was 
succeeded by Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, brother of the then Sultan of Kedah. 
UMNO  described  itself  as  a  liberal  nationalist  party  dedicated  to  Malay  political 
dominance but committed to democracy, the free market, inter-ethnic harmony and ‘Western 
traditions  of  a  secular  state  (Funston  1980:  23).  It  forged  an  alliance  with  a  Chinese 
businessman-dominated organization called the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the 
Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), led mainly by Indian professionals to contest elections to the 
Federal Legislative Council in June 1955. This multi-ethnic Alliance won 51  of the 52 seats 
contested.  It  continued  to  stand  for  elections  on a  common  platform  of  moderation,  ethnic 
compromise  and  economic  development,  but  with  each  component  expected  to  mobilize 
support from its own ethnic constituency. The 1957 independent Constitution of Malaya (now 
referred to  as Peninsular Malaysia following the  entry of the British colonies  of Sabah  and 
Sarawak in 1963 into the larger Federation of Malaysia) called for a federation of the eleven 
states, a constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary democracy modeled after British. 
The Constitution also safeguarded the position of the nine Malay sultans who would take 
turns to become the country’s king for five year periods. It provided for Malay as the national 
language,  affirmative  action  privileges  for  Malays  in  education,  employment  and  business 
opportunities,  and  prescribed  Islam  as  the  official  religion.  UMNO  had  insisted  on  these 
provisions as a ‘compensation’ for the ‘Malay loss of exclusive nationhood’. Both UMNO and PAS, 
in varying degrees, had demanded that it must be the indigenous Malays who would determine 
the nature and future of the land (Hong Hai 1997: 10). The provision for Islam allowed state 
funds to be utilized for religious activities and for the shari’ah courts to enforce the limited body Muslim Politics in Malaysia and the Democratization Process 
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of personal and family laws applicable to Muslims. The UMNO leadership made it clear that the 
constitutional article on Islam as the religion of the federation did not in any way imply an 
Islamic state (Ahmad 1997: 27).  
The evolution of UMNO as the leading component of the ruling party can be divided into 
three eras. The first was between independence in 1957 and the racial riots following the May 
1969 elections under the leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman and ‘an alliance between Malay 
aristocrats,  bureaucrats  and  Chinese  business  in  the  context  of  an  economy  dominated  by 
foreign capital’ (Crouch 1996: 76). It can be described as a period of liberal democracy and 
continuity of the colonial administration structures. The second, between 1969 and 1981 and 
under Abdul Razak and Hussein Onn, was the beginning of an era of ‘retreat from the secular 
path’ by introducing the Malay economic nationalism. The third period under Mahathir from 
1981 onwards can be divided into an earlier period of liberalism and, beginning from the late 
1980s, a period of ‘modified authoritarianism’ (Crouch  1996: 76) which continues with the 
impressive economic growth and by  purposeful identification with Islam.  
The first generation leaders of UMNO were attentive to the symbols of Islam. The UMNO 
Constitution has as one of its objectives the defense and expansion of Islam. UMNO insisted on 
Islam as the  official religion of the federation against the reservations of the Malay sultans 
fearful of losing their last bastion of power. To address this fear, Islam was constitutionally 
listed as the prerogative of the states and under the headship of the sultans (Hashim 1963: 1-
17). Even UMNO leaders insisted that its interest in Islam was not based on political expediency; 
external pressures had clearly been a catalyst. 
The question of how to deal with the Islamists was uppermost in Mahathir’s political 
agenda when he took office in 1981. Unlike his predecessors, Mahathir was more prepared to 
accommodate  the  dissenting  Islamists.  Even  before  assuming  office,  he  had  expressed  a 
willingness to increase the role of Islam in society and governance. This helped persuade the 
ABIM leader Anwar Ibrahim to accept Mahathir’s invitation to join UMNO just prior to the 1982 
elections.   
Among  Mahathir’s  earlier  policy  statements  as  prime  minister  was  one  on  the 
‘assimilation of Islamic values in the administration’. The policy was described as ‘an effort to 
strike a balance between the spiritual and material’  which  would  proceed  with  ‘incremental, 
moderate implementation… taking into account the sensitivities of the non-Muslim population’ 
(Ahmad Hussein 2002: 75-107). It was not a radical policy redirection; it was not about creating 
an Islamic state or implementing the Islamic law (shari’ah). Nevertheless, the policy was the 
most purposeful expression of an Islamization process that UMNO had ever made. 
The programmes were many and varied. Aware of the value of the ‘politics of symbolic 
action’,  the  emphasis  on  the  symbolic-the  use  of  Islamic  terminologies  and  salutations,  the 
building  of  Islamic  complexes,  international  conferences,  research  institutes,  Islamic 
programmes on radio and television, Islamic courses for the public-continued with increased 
vigour.  But  more  substantive  programmes  were  added  to  the  list:  the  establishment  of  an 
international Islamic university; the introduction of Islamic securities, banking and insurance 
systems; amendments to the Constitution to give increased powers to Islamic legal authorities, 
reforms of Islamic administration, laws and courts; and serious efforts to promote uniformity 
and coordination between states. In the realm of law, the most contested terrain in Islamic 
politics, ‘nowhere in Asia has the Islamization of law proceeded more  methodically than in 
Malaysia…dozens  of  new  statutes  and  judicial  decisions  have  clarified,  expanded,  and 
reformulated the law applicable to Muslims ’ (Harrowitz 1994: 22). 
Following PAS, impressive victory in the 1999 elections, Mahathir and his successor , 
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, became preoccupied with ways and means to counter the rising tide 
against  the  UMNO,  particularly  the  Malay  heartland  (Khadijah  2007:  138-153).  As  PAS’ 
popularity among the Malays began seriously undermine the UMNO’s hegemony, the NF (BN) 
government  actively  started promoting what  it  termed  was  ‘a  more  moderate  and  tolerant 
brand of Islam’. The UMNO began actively condemning the ostensibly radical Islam propagated International Journal of Islamic Thought 
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by PAS, claiming that it was threatening national unity. The UMNO also asserted that PAS has 
manipulated Islam to achieve its political objective of securing power. 
As a means to counter what Mahathir believed that PAS was form of political Islam, he 
felt that his successor as prime minister had to possess adequate, if not impressive, Islamic 
credentials  that  could  help  his  party  win  back  the  support  of  many  disillusioned  Malays. 
Mahathir himself would admit that Abdullah was chosen as his deputy because of the latter’s 
impeccable Islamic credentials which could be used to help win over the hearts and minds of 
rural voters. Abdullah was also seen as the only leader who could help unite the divided Malay 
community following the Anwar Ibrahim debacle. 
 
Abdullah Premiership 
 
After more than 20 years of Mahathirism, on 1 November 2003, Mahathir retired from public 
office, handing the premiership to his chosen successor, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. It is believed 
that one credible reason for his decision to retire was his fear that if he remained in office, 
UMNO’s  stranglehold  on  power  would  have  been  seriously  jeopardized  given  his  declining 
support among rural Malays, long the party’s traditional bastion of support. During the 2004 
general elections, Abdullah led the NF (BN) to an extra ordinary electoral victory where the 
ruling coalition secured more than 90 per cent of the seats in parliament, severely undermining 
the  opposition  and  closing  a  long  chapter  in  Malaysian  political  discourse  on  reformation 
agenda. 
After Abdullah took over the premiership he introduced new initiatives that would help 
discard  the  idea  that  his  premiership  would  be  conditioned  by  the  many  legacies  of  his 
predecessor. More importantly, Abdullah was particularly concerned with the need to rebuild 
UMNO’s image as a party committed to championing the interests of the Malays. 
Abdullah’s most important contribution to Malaysian politics was his promotion of his 
own personal imprint of a form of Islam acceptable to all Malaysians. Civilizational Islam (Islam 
Hadhari) can be interpreted as an attempt by Prime Minister Abdullah to dissociate himself 
from the type of Islam promoted by Mahathir, a practice of faith that was apparently far too 
biased towards the idea of material development with inadequate attention to matters spiritual. 
The  Abdullah  government  introduced  the  concept  of  Islam Hadhari  in  the  UMNO/NF  (BN) 
manifesto  for  the  2004  general  elections.  In  his  election  campaigns,  Abdullah  repeatedly 
stressed that while his Islam Hadhari was progressive and inclusive, PAS’ understanding of 
Islam, that it wanted to foist on all Malaysians, was reactionary and exclusive. For Abdullah, 
Islam Hadhari was suitable and relevant in the context of Malaysia’s multi-ethnic and multi-
religious society. 
The Civilizational Islam (Islam Hadhari), as espoused by Abdullah, served to achieve two 
basic goals. First, the concept helped to situate the role of Islam and the Muslim community 
(ummah)  in  the  context  of  the  development  of  the  Malaysian  economy.  Muslims  would  be 
encouraged to seek knowledge, namely in science and technology, which could, in turn, help 
improve the socio-economic standing of the community (ummah) as well as generate economic 
growth.  Second,  Islam  Hadhari  would  help  bridge  differences  between  Muslims  and  non-
Muslims, thus serving to overcome racial polarization that remained a serious problem in the 
country (Khadijah 2007: 139).  
Although  Abdullah  made  a  concerted  effort  to  articulate  his  understanding  of  Islam 
Hadhari, most analysts appeared baffled about the difference between this concept and that of 
the  Islamic  agenda  of  past  UMNO  led  NF  (BN)  government.  What  was  clear  with  the 
introduction and active propagation of Islam Hadhari was that for both UMNO and PAS, Islam 
was  seen  as  the  most  important  and  effective  means  to  secure  political  support.  UMNO, 
however, hoped that with Islam Hadhari, the party had found a means to propagate a concept 
that though inherently divisive in the Malaysian context, yet was one that could attract the 
support of non-Muslims as well. One analyst would note that Abdullah’s Islam Hadhari had 
made quite an impression on members of the non-Muslim community (Lah Yi 2004).  Muslim Politics in Malaysia and the Democratization Process 
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Leaders of the Western world also appeared enamoured by Abdullah’s Islam Hadhari, 
seen primarily in the comment they made during the Malaysian prime minister’s official visits to 
the US, France and Britain a few months after the March 2004 elections. For example, British 
Prime  Minister  Tony  Blair  described  Malaysia  as  a  model  Islamic  country  that  should  be 
emulated by the rest of the Muslim world (New Straits Times 2004).   
 
Mohd Najib Ascension as Prime Minister 
 
Since the aftermath of the 8th March 2008 general election, the Malaysian political landscape 
went through a number of upheavals with questions raised over the continuing viability of 
National Front coalition rule and the future socio-political direction of the country. No one 
predicted that National Front (NF) would suffer the worst loss since its establishment in 1974 
(Chamil 2009: 169-180). NF leaders themselves believed that they would suffer some losses, but 
not to the extent that NF would lose a two-thirds majority in parliament or that NF would lose 
control of four states (Kedah, Pulau Pinang, Perak and Selangor). However, the unexpected 
happened during the March 2008 elections. In the previous general elections which were held 
on March 21, 2004, Abdullah was handed a majority victory in parliament; four years later the 
results were completely different. 
The final results were approximately double the predicted swing of less than 15 per 
cent, or 30 to 40 parliamentary seats. The NF coalition won just 140 of the 222 parliamentary 
seats on offer and only 51.2 per cent of the valid popular vote (O’ Shanessy 2008: 88-109). All of 
the main component parties of the NF suffered. In fact, the NF majority in parliament hinged 
upon its support in Sabah and Sarawak where it won 55 of the 57 parliamentary seats on offer. 
In contrast, all of the opposition parties posted remarkable gains with the PKR increasing its 
presence in parliament from a seat in 2004 to 31 seats in 2008, PAS secured 23 seats compared 
to  its  7  seats  in  2004  and  the  DAP  won  28  seats,  up  from  its  previous  seats.  These  gains 
increased the total opposition presence in parliament to 82 seats from 21 seats in 2004 (O’ 
Shanessy 2008: 98). 
Realising the fact that there was growing pressure for him to step down, and the anxiety 
amongst UMNO members was not abating, and at the same time the opposition led by Anwar 
Ibrahim continued to bring defeat to the (National Front or Barisan Nasional), Abdullah finally 
decided to step down and Dato’ Seri Mohd Najib was appointed as the sixth Prime Minister on 3 
April 2009. Although his successes may be attributed to the fact that he is the son of Malaysia’s 
second Prime minister, Tun Abdul Razak, where the groundwork was laid out for him by his late 
father, however, it is important  to be note that although he was afforded  the opportunity to 
succeed in the political arena, it was ultimately his own efforts, intelligence, political savvy, 
merits, and courage which allowed him to grasp the most significant political prize of all, that of 
becoming Malaysia’s Prime Minister.  
 
Mohd Najib’s Transformation Programmes 
 
As a politician, Mohd Najib is not only a realist but he is also  a pragmatist, who is not fanatical 
about any one particular ideology, as he himself explained, as a pragmatic person he said: “I 
believe in beginning policies which can fulfill national policies” (Chamil 2009: 189). This means if 
the national policies may be achieved by embracing a free market economy, then he in favor of 
that. If, in order to achieve national policy requires the involvement of the government, that 
would also be considered. As far as approach is concerned, his emphasis is on what one may 
achieve in the real world. 
1 Malaysia Vision 
 
After  becoming  Prime  Minister,  Mohd  Najib  pledged  to  make  a  huge  transformation  to  the 
country by introducing his ‘1 Malaysia, People First, Performance Now’  as a way to accelerate 
Malaysian’s performance in order to make Malaysia into  a developed nation by 2020. According International Journal of Islamic Thought 
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to him unity amongst Malaysians is a pre-condition to achieving the Vision 2020 aspirations. He 
believes that for a country to develop, its people must first advance by embracing diversity in 
ethnicity,  religion  and  beliefs  and  by  being  inclusive  through  building  mutual  respect  and 
acceptance,  such  that  a  solid  foundation  of  trust and  cohesiveness  exists.  Only  as  a  united 
people,  according  to  him,  Malaysia  can  embark  on  the  broader  development  of  Malaysia’s 
nation. Mohd Najib added that “the Bangsa Malaysia concept was not aimed at imposing Malay 
culture on other races, but to further strengthen multiracial Malaysia. It is about bonding and 
working together for the benefit of all Malaysians. Ultimately we share the wealth of the country 
together” (Yeoh 2009: 43-48).  
Mohd Najib’s concept of 1 Malaysia stressed on respect for the diversity amongst various 
ethnic groups of the Malaysian society and leverages this diversity as a competitive asset for the 
nation. The spirit of his ‘1 Malaysia’ was completely different from the ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ 
slogan advocated by the Democratic Action Party (DAP) which rejected the very idea of special 
rights for the Malays. It was also different from the New Malaysia ideology which rejected the 
notion of Malay supremacy and wanted the special treatment accorded to the Malays and other 
bumiputras  be  abolished.  Mohd  Najib’s  concept  emphasizes  on  inclusiveness  through  the 
acceptance of differences and encourages all Malaysians to embrace the unique qualities of each 
group (PM Dept. 2009: 54-55). Ultimately the principle of fairness to all is the underpinning of 
Mohd Najib’s ‘1 Malaysia’. Nevertheless, according to him this fairness must account for their 
different levels of development.   
Mohd Najib recognized that the affirmative elements of the New Economic Policy (NEP) 
were still needed in terms of its pledge to correct the historical imbalances which had thus far 
sidelined  the  rural  Malays.  But  he  also  gave  the  impression  that  changes  would  be  made 
drawing on healthy competitive elements. This meant that Malay and bumiputera corporations 
would compete amongst themselves, against one another, and against non-Malay corporations. 
He insisted that “More bumiputera companies should be prepared to compete because when they 
compete, the best of what they have to offer will become manifest” (Wariya 2009: 185). Mohd 
Najib admitted that eradicating the groups that depend on commissions would not be easy and 
could  not  be  done  overnight.  However,  according  to  him:  “The best way forward,  for their 
interests and for the interests of this nation,  is to  adopt open competition, be it amongst the 
bumiputra community or free competition for all ” (Chamil 2009: 185). 
 
New Economic Model (NEM) 
 
The second initiative of Mohd Najib was the New Economic Model (NEM). The main reason for 
introducing  this  NEM  was  the  realization  that  with  the  increasing  challenge  in  the  global 
environment, he believed that the elements of Malaysia’s economy will need to be structurally 
upgraded in order for the country to avoid the middle income trap and to increase the growth 
rate. Mohd Najib is aware that the country cannot afford to coast along and he made it clear 
even before he became Prime Minster that a transformation of the Malaysian economy is a 
necessity. In his letter to the ‘ Wall Street Journal’ in March 2009, he stated that “Malaysia will 
invest  in  education  and  technology,  further  strengthening  Malaysia’s  capacity  to  lead  in 
information technologies, renewable energy and emerging sectors of the new economy . . . We are 
remaking Malaysia once again”  (Yeoh  2009:  34-36).  Malaysia  needs  a  model  which  is  more 
relevant to current times. Noor Mohamed Yackop, Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department 
stated to the World Bank team of experts: “To move to a higher income-based economy, we have 
to move towards a knowledge and innovation-based economy where skilled labour is needed . . . 
We are trapped in a middle-income gap” (Mohamed 2009: 56).     
This New Economic Model (NEM) is currently being developed by the National Economic 
Advisory Council (NEAC) to guide the economic strategy of Malaysia. This will be reinforced by 
the  Tenth  Malaysia  Plan  (2011-2015).  According  to  Mohd  Najib,  the  difficult  move  from  a 
middle-income to a high-income economy does not necessarily mean venturing into completely 
new sectors. It may also mean using a strategy of building on the sectors in which Malaysia has Muslim Politics in Malaysia and the Democratization Process 
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already demonstrated levels of competitiveness, such as in services such as tourism, ICT, finance 
and Islamic banking, especially industries such as green technology, electronics manufacturing 
and resource-based industries.  
Among the most important challenges in achieving the NEM objective is to move up the 
value chain e.g., from pure assembly to more technology-intensive products and services, from 
labour-intensive and low value-added activities towards innovation-based activities that add 
more  value.  In  addressing  the  skill  requirements  needed  to  move  towards  a  high-income 
economy,  the  Government  is  taking  a  holistic  approach,  which  addresses,  among  others:  1. 
Reforming education towards producing skills demanded by industry; 2. Creating supportive 
policies  toward  nurturing,  attracting  and  retaining  the  most  talented  people  of 
Malaysia;3.Devising appropriate policies for low-skilled and high-skilled foreign labour to meet 
skill shortages, and; 4. Promoting an efficient  labour market (Mohd Najib 2009: 54-60).  
In short, Mohd Najib believes that to move towards becoming a high-income nation 
requires  specialized  production  and  specialized  exports.  According  to  him,  Malaysia  cannot 
afford to cast our net too wide and spread our human capital, financial incentives and R&D 
resources too thinly (Mohd Najib 2009:  54-60). “The intense international competition dictates 
that Malaysia must excel in the areas we choose to pursue”, he added. 
 
Economic Transformation Programme (ETP) 
 
The ETP is the first time that any effort of this kind has been undertaken in Malaysia’s history. 
This is a comprehensive effort that will transform Malaysia into a high-income nation by 2020. 
The programme provides strong focus on a few key growth areas (engines): the 12 National Key 
Economic Areas (NKEAs). These NKEASs are  expected to make substantial contributions to 
Malaysia’s economic performance, and they will receive priority from public investment and 
policy support. The 131 entry point projects (EPPs) have been identified that correctly outline 
actions required to grow the Malaysian economy. The Malaysian government is aware that with 
an increasingly challenging global business environment the country needs a fundamentally 
new economic model in order to become a high-income nation with a per capita income of about 
RM 48,000 or USD 15,000 in 2020. To achieve high-income status by 2020 the country will 
require an annual real growth rate of about 6 percent in the next 10 years. 
Among the measures which have been designed by the Malaysian government to achieve 
high-income  status  is  that  the  country  needs  to  remain  sustainable  in  both  economic  and 
environmental  terms,  meeting  present  needs  without  compromising  those  of  future 
generations. This means that the country will achieve growth without running down its own 
natural resources. In addition to that Malaysia also will reduce its dependence on petroleum and 
liquid  gas  as  the  primary  economic  contributor,  and  to  ensure  fiscal  sustainability  the 
government will encourage private sector-led investment as a means to avoid dependence on 
public  funding.    Since  the  objective  to  make  Malaysia  a  high  income  nation  is  not  just  a 
quantitative target only, but also how to make Malaysia an advanced, developed nation with 
high-income  economy  characteristics,  the  way  in  which  the  country  grows  to  achieve  this 
objective will be inclusive in nature which will provide opportunities for all Malaysians to share 
in the benefit by encouraging employment-rich growth that can create 3.3 million new jobs (PM 
Dept. 2010, 5-6). The investments made by the Malaysian government in education and training 
is regarded as an effort to ensure that more Malaysians are able to participate in these new 
opportunities  with  the  end  objective  of  lifting  the  income  of  the  bottom  40  percent  of 
households from RM 1, 440.00 in 2009 to RM 2, 300.00 in 2015. 
The Government Transformation Programme (GTP) can be regarded as a roadmap to 
achieved the ‘1 Malaysia Vision’ and the ‘Economic Transformation Programme (ETP) which 
aimed at making Malaysia as developed county by 2020. This is a development planning unit led 
by Prime Minister Najib and his cabinet, and the document of this GTP was spearheaded by the 
Minister for Unity and Performance Management and the CEO of the PEMANDU in response to 
the Prime Minister’s call for greater accountability of the government and to formulate the International Journal of Islamic Thought 
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detail targets. The rationale of this GTP is that the Malaysian government needs a new way of 
doing things to accelerate and sustain its impact on country economy. Although the GTP only 
represent as an initial set of actions in areas identified as National Key Result Areas (NKRAs) 
and Ministerial Key Result Areas (MKRAs) which intended to delivered the mentioned target; 
nevertheless, as a roadmap it has successfully designed its way in achieving the objective of 
making Malaysia a high-income country by 2020 through three phases: Phase 1 (2010-2012).  An 
immediate objective of this phase is to establish a new engine for change and deliver substantial 
outcomes  for  all  Malaysians  quickly;  Phase  2  (2012-2015).  At  this  stage  the  Malaysian 
government  expecting  the  country  economy  structure  already  evolved  in  line  with  New 
Economic Model (NEM) where the first sign of a higher income country should be emerging. 
Phase 3 (2015-2020).In  this  period  of  time  it  is  expecting  that  the  fundamental  changes  to 
Malaysian society taking place and all Malaysian experiencing a new sense of being Malaysian, 
with a higher prosperity and better public service.  
Looking at the growth rate of the Malaysian economy in the third quarter Gross National 
Income  was  better  than  expected  at  5.2  per  cent  between  July  and  September  2012  amid 
challenging  global  economic  conditions.  Again,  the  new  measurers  to  speeds  the  economic 
growth and creating more jobs opportunities for Malaysians, on November  16, 2012 Prime 
Minister Mohd Najib unveiled another 20 ETP new projects that will result in RM 26.1 billion to 
the country’s Gross National Income and create 64,284 jobs by 2020 (New Straits Times 2012). 
According  to  Prime  Minister  Mohd  Najib,  despite  continuing  global  uncertainty,  Malaysia 
remains an attractive destination for investment. As he said that “Our growth remains strong, the 
fundamentals of our economy are sound and our commitment to structural change encourages 
investors to see Malaysia as a country that looks to the future” (New Straits Times 2012).  
It is believed that with the 20 more ETP mentioned projects certainly would improve 
further the job market because of an expected increase in the number of jobs generated by the 
projects, and at the same time also the business supplying goods and services would also benefit 
from the ETP project, as supplier of good and services for the ETP project would benefit in 
terms of higher sales as well as revenue growth, and in turn these business will be able to 
remunerate their employees better and hire more workers; and according to the RAM Holding 
chief economist, Yeah Kim Leng that the ETP project affirmed Malaysia’s attractiveness as an 
investment destination (New Straits Times 2012). 
         
Global Movement of Moderates Foundation (GMMF) 
 
As a realist and a pragmatic leader, Mohd Najib is very concerned about what’s going on in 
different parts of the world today, and according to him among the most important challenges 
confronting the international community today that needs to be addressed collectively, is the 
challenge  of  ensuring  a  just,  equitable  and  durable  peace.  Mohd  Najib  has  a  view  that  an 
everlasting peace can be achieved which is based upon the premise of a ‘covenant of the willing 
and not one enforced by way of hegemony through fear and coercion’ (Mohd Najib 2010).  “One 
way to achieve such peace is through constructive dialogue which will help in creating a deeper 
understanding and respect of each other in our conviction to create a better future for all citizens 
of the world ”, he added. 
He believes that it is impossible for the world community to get rid of world extreme 
views  by  force;  because  violence  begets  violence,  according  to  him,  “the best way to foster 
tolerance and understanding is not by silencing the voice of hatred but by making the voice of 
reason  louder  (Mohd  Najib  2012).  Furthermore,  persuasion,  negotiation  and  co-operation 
should be the weapons in the face of enmity and malice. He is very concerned on the increasing 
trend in some parts of the world to perpetuate or even fuel Islamophobia. Attempts to demonize 
Islam offend the one and a half billion adherents of the religion. It intensifies the divide between 
the  broad  Muslim  world  and  the  west.  The  ‘real  issue’  according  to  Najib  is  not  between 
Muslims and non-Muslims but between moderates and extremists of all religions, be it Islam, 
Christianity or Judaism. Across all religions there exist the ugly voices of the periphery to drown Muslim Politics in Malaysia and the Democratization Process 
Lukman Thaib 
 
54 
out the many voices of reason and common sense. Therefore he urges the world community to 
embark on building a “Global Movement of the Moderate” from all faiths who are committed to 
work together to combat extremists who have held the world hostage with their bigotry and 
bias. He repeatedly said that we have to urgently reclaim the centre and the moral high ground 
that has been usurped from us. He also added “We must choose moderation over extremism and 
we must choose negotiations over confrontation. We must choose to work together and not against 
each other” (Mohd Najib 2012). 
Moderation according to him is an age-old value, and one that runs right to the heart of 
the great religions. In Islam, the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) counsels that “moderation is the 
best of actions (Khair al-umur ausatuha) ”, in Christianity, the Bible says ” let your moderation be 
known unto all men “; and in Judaism, the Torah teaches that moderation in all things is “ the  
way of life” (Mohd Najib 2012) in the truest sense of Jewish custom. According to Mohd Najib, 
history  has  been  made  not  by  those  who  espoused  extremism  but  by  those  who  without 
surrendering their beliefs, stayed true to the path of moderation. He added, we are all familiar 
with the extraordinary strength of will and leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela and 
Aung San Suu Kyi. Moderates can make a difference whenever they make a stand. Mohd Najib 
added that it is time for the massed ranks of the moderates everywhere to stand up and to say 
to the extremists with a single breath a firm, resounding “No”. 
Malaysia is a country which stands at the geographical cross roads of major civilizations 
and  religions  of  the  world  which  makes  all  Malaysian  people  ready  to  play  their  role  in 
promoting  religious  understanding,  harmony  and  tolerance.  To  further  strengthen  the 
Malaysian process of national unity, as the sixth Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mohd Najib has 
introduced a philosophy known as 1 Malaysia, which can be regarded as a vision that seeks 
renewal  and rejuvenation to bring all Malaysian people together in a just and harmonious 
relationship. 1 Malaysia is a call for the acceptance of diversity as a source of greater unity 
which  indicates  that  Malaysia  is  a  country  that  is  celebrating  their  multi-ethnic  and  multi-
religious society for strategic strength and harmony. 
As a democratic country with a multi-racial, multi-religious, multi-cultural society which 
has benefited from the positive interaction and synergy between the various communities, the 
country  is  able  to  share  her  experience  in  managing  issues  of  diversity  with  other  world 
communities. According to Mohd Najib, Malaysia is a country that has long  been synonymous 
not with extremism but with moderation, tolerance, inclusivity and even acceptance because  
the Malaysians are  aware that they can only become strong when they actively embrace their 
differences and it is in this spirit that Prime Minister Mohd Najib  initiated the first ever meeting 
of the ‘Global Movement of the Moderates’ in Putrajaya on January 17, 2012 (Mohd Najib 2012) 
and the launching of the formation of the Institute of  al-Wasatiyyah (Global Movement of the 
Moderate Foundation (GMMF). 
Mohd Najib’s concept of moderation is not confined to religious extremism only, instead 
it  is  a  step  which  will  be  able  to  steer  the  international  community  from  the  dangerous 
extremes, social, political and economic that could cause the nation lasting damage. He urged 
international leaders to devise a system that can deliver fairness for “the 99 percent”, and not 
just for those at the top (Mohd Najib 2012). The international community no longer can tolerate 
the workings of the markets to be value-free or value neutral. According to him  markets are the 
only route to rising global prosperity and sustained, stable growth, but at the same time the 
international leaders also must do away with unjust, unfair outcomes they can produce when 
left  unchecked,  and  with  the  reckless  economic  practices  which  makes  our  global  financial 
system unstable, by quoting the statement of Thomas Jefferson saying that “the selfish spirit of 
commerce knows no country, and feels no passion of principle but that of gain”  (Mohd  Najib 
2012). Based on this reality the Britain’s Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks has written of the need for 
employers, bankers and shareholders to be “guided, even if no-one is watching, by a sense of 
what is responsible and right.” Mohd Najib believes the structures and principles of Islamic 
finance which has long put public good ahead of an individual gain could contribute something 
in providing a solid ethical foundation for economic activity. International Journal of Islamic Thought 
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Mohd Najib believed that oppression and tyranny can only win out if good men and 
women stand idly by, unwilling to turn rhetoric into action and opinions into deeds. He urged 
international leaders come together commit ourselves to change and begin the task of building a 
new coalition of the moderates for our times. He concluded his call at the 65th Session of the 
United  Nations  General  Assembly  by  saying:  “It is time for moderates of all countries, of all 
religions  to  take  back  the  centre,  to  reclaim  the  agenda  for  peace  and  pragmatism,  and  to 
marginalize the extremists. This is an opportunity for  all of us to provide the much needed 
leadership  to  bring  hope  and  restore  dignity  for  all”  (Mohd  Najib  2010).  He  believed  with 
greater will and collective determination, we will build a more peaceful, secure and equitable 
world.       
As a conclusion, since the early 1990s, intra-Malay politics, specifically the contentious 
UMNO-PAS rivalry, has dominated Malaysian politics and society, particularly in the north and 
north-eastern Malay states of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Terengganu.  The battle for the hearts 
and minds of the Malay populace had been largely fought through the propagation of brands of 
Islam with each contending party claimed most fairly reflected the true teachings of Islam. 
Throughout  the  1990s,  the  debate  on  the  values  and  practice  of  Islam  coincided  with  the 
aspirations of Tun Mahathir to modernize and industrialize the Malaysian economy. In his aim 
to transform Malaysia’s economy and society, Tun Mahathir’s government was criticized by PAS 
for neglecting the spiritual and religious development of its citizens. 
One of Tun Abdullah’s immediate tasks on his appointment as Prime Minister was to 
regain the support of the Malays who had abandoned UMNO for PAS. The results of the historic 
1999 general elections, held at the height of Anwar’s reformation agenda, was a clear warning to 
UMNO that it was well on the road to oblivion in the Malay heartland. For Abdullah, whose 
Islamic  credentials  gave  him  some  credibility  to  take  on  the  PAS  Islamic  scholars  on  an 
interpretation  of  the  religion,  one  way  to  secure  the  support  of  the  disenchanted  Malay 
electorate was through the promotion of a more tolerant and compassionate brand of Islam-
civilizational Islam(Islam Hadhari). The nebulous nature of this concept suggests, however, that 
Islam Hadhari was more a political ploy to secure support than a real vision for the practice of 
this religion in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. The government remains embroiled in 
an attempt to define this concept in an articulate and coherent fashion. It is, however, probably 
unnecessary, for Abdullah’s government to define Islam Hadhari as this study has brought into 
question the importance of Islam in securing the support of the Malay electorate. 
The  perceived  importance  of  Islam  in  understanding  the  impressive  2004  electoral 
performance of the NF (BN) was a result of the active promotion of Abdullah as an exemplary 
Muslim  leader.  It  was,  however,  the  successful  propagation  of  the  idea  that  Abdullah  was 
committed to the flight of poor Malays, his active promotion of his intent to develop the rural 
economy and his declaration to create a more transparent and credible administration that was 
most crucial in swinging votes to UMNO in the 2004 general election. 
Even  before  becoming  the  sixth  Prime  Minister  for  Malaysia,  Mohd  Najib  was  quite 
aware that the country cannot afford to coast along and he made it clear that a transformation 
of the Malaysian economy is a necessity. Najib believed that with the increasing challenge in the 
global  environment  that  the  elements  of  Malaysia’s  economy  will  need  to  be  structurally 
upgraded in order for the country to avoid the middle income trap and to increase the growth 
rate.  Malaysia  needs  a  model  which  is  more  relevant  to  current  times.  For  that  reason  he 
introduced the Economic Transformation Programme (ETP). The ETP is the first time that any 
effort of this kind has been undertaken in Malaysia’s history. This is a comprehensive effort that 
will transform Malaysia into a high-income nation with a per capita income of about RM 48,000 
or  USD  15,000  by  2020.  Among  the  measures  which  have  been  designed  by  the  Malaysian 
government to achieve high-income status is that the country needs to remain sustainable in 
both economic and environmental term, meeting present needs without compromising those of 
future generations. 
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As a pragmatic leader, Mohd Najib believes that among the most important challenges 
today is the challenge of ensuring a just, equitable and durable peace. He has a view that an 
everlasting peace can be achieved which is based upon the premise of a ‘covenant of the willing 
and not one enforce by way of hegemony through fear and coercion’. One way to achieve such 
peace according to him is through constructive dialogue which will help in creating a deeper 
understanding  and  respect  of  each  other  in  our  conviction  to  create  a  better  future  for  all 
citizens of the world.  
The real issue is not between Muslims and non-Muslims but between moderates and 
extremists of all religions, be it Islam, Christianity or Judaism. Therefore, he urge the world 
community to embark on building a “Global Movement of the Moderate ” from all faiths who are 
committed to work together to combat extremists who have held the world hostage with their 
bigotry and bias. Mohd Najib said: “We must choose moderation over extremism and we must 
choose negotiations over confrontation. We must choose to work together and not again each 
other”.  Malaysia  according  to  him  is  a  country  that  has  long  been  synonymous  not  with 
extremism  but  with  moderation,  tolerance,  inclusivity  and  even  acceptance  because  the 
Malaysians  are  aware  that  they  can  only  become  strong  when  they  actively  embrace  their 
differences and it is in this spirit Prime Minster Mohd Najib initiated the first ever meeting of 
the ‘Global Movement for Moderates’ in Putrajaya on January 17, 2012 and the launching of the 
formation  of  the  Institute of al-Wasatiyyah  (Global Movement of the Moderate Foundation or 
GMMF). 
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